The U.S. should immediately pull out of Chicago!
Body count. In the last six months 292 killed (murdered) in Chicago, 221 killed in Iraq.
Opinion and analysis of current events: Geopolitics, U.S. politics, global warming and more. A realistic, moderate, left leaning look at politics.
The U.S. should immediately pull out of Chicago!
Body count. In the last six months 292 killed (murdered) in Chicago, 221 killed in Iraq.
You make one fatal assumption, however. You believe that the North Koreans would believe that we would actually attack them. There's no way we would, right now. Maybe 10 years ago they would have believed us capable, when we weren't involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there's no way now.
I am not against diplomacy backed up by force (you do need carrots to go along with those sticks, though). The worry by you conservatives would be, of course, you have to be willing to actually use that force when push comes to shove. I might have said some contradictory things before, but I do believe that force is sometimes necessary. You just have to know when to limit it. I believe that the invasion of Grenada, the invasion of Panama, the first Gulf War, and Clinton's Operation Desert Fox were all necessary and carried out well. We did not occupy for five years and we only took down the government when we knew what we were getting into - we knew our limits.
I hate to sound like that liberal that always goes back to blaming Bush, but: Bush did not know his limits. He unnecessarily invaded Iraq, which took away press, money, supplies, troops, and most importantly public attention away from Afghanistan. Maybe we could have launched airstrikes in Iraq. Maybe that would have been acceptable; however, overthrowing the Hussein regime took it to far. And Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Co. didn't even do it well! The occupation of Iraq was a failure.
Anyway, I'm getting a little side tracked. My point is this: negotiations carried out with the threat of force are always great, as long as you know your limits.
So: how about in 10 years, when we're out of Iraq and Afghanistan (I can't wait), we settle down and talk to those Russians. Tell them, hey, you invade Germany from your newly established bases in conquered Poland - we'll kick your ass.
NYT: Draft Accord With Iraq Sets Goal of 2011 Pullout
Note
I cannot fully write about this yet because of the fact that the agreement has not been released, and I don’t know if the full treaty will every fully be released. However: details will continue to come in, and as they do, I will write new articles.
A good plan
United States and Iraqi negotiators have been haggling over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for several months now. Up until now, the international military presence in Iraq has been legitimized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This new agreement will last three years and its main points are this:
1. U.S. troops must move outside of cities by June 30, 2009
2. Withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the end of December 31, 2011
3. No immunity for private contractors
4. Some immunity for American soldiers (immunity if on base or on duty)
5. A failsafe in case Iraq collapses
This plan is much better than either plan submitted by the two presidential contenders: McCain would stay too long (forever), Obama too short (16 months). This plan does not have the drawbacks of either.
Michael Cohen over at Democracy Arsenal and in the WSJ today argues that no immunity for private contractors will impede on their ability to do their duty properly in Iraq. That is not true for at least two reasons:
1. Any private contractors put on trial that didn’t really do anything wrong will not be convicted; U.S. pressure will assure to that.
2. Because the Iraqi government was so strong about putting this resolution in the agreement, the government gains legitimacy among the Iraqi people. Maliki, in particular, looks extra-nationalist and therefore extra popular.
On Iran
I’ve noticed a lack of discussion about Iran on this. I’m waiting to see Iran’s reaction to this (and consequently the reaction of Muqtada al-Sadr). I'll keep y'all posted.
On the Sunni Awakening
The NYT is also reporting that the Shiite-led Iraqi government is refusing to incorporate the 100,000 strong Sunni Awakening – Sunnis paid by the U.S. to take up arms against Al-Qaeda and other insurgents. It is vital that the al-Maliki government incorporates the Sunnis into the government. It is impossible to state the importance of this enough. If they are not incorporated, I fear a resumption of the civil war and a strengthening of the insurgency.
Reuters: U.S. blames Shi'ite group ... for bombing and killing of 63 Shiites
Sure, it's easy to see they're trying to stir up sectarian violence. But if your sect is that important, why not blow up some Sunnis instead of your own Shiites? 3 possibilities:
1. It was accident.
2. Religion isn't as important in Iraq as it's made out to be. Or maybe the situation has evolved to that state.
3. The special Shiite cell was from Iran and didn't care so much for Iraqi Shiites.
Option 3 seems the most likely, for several reasons. See: Europe announces new Iranian sanctions during Bush visit
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Reuters: U.S., Iran and Arab neighbors to meet on Iraq
This will be the first time Iranian and American negotiators will (publicly) be in the same room since talks over Iraqi security have been suspended. The U.S. should take this chance to publicly say:
1. That a peaceful Iraq will not be possible without Iran
2. Iran should stop arming Shiite militias
3. A stable Iraq is in the interests of Iran and the Sunni countries of the region
McCain: U.S. can win Iraq war by 2013
Mhmmm... Mhmmm... Mhmmm... No.
Daniel Graeber has an interesting article in UPI (h/t) on the long term consequences of arming Sunni militias in Iraq.
But as the Sons of Iraq increasingly shed blood for the country, they are growing increasingly disenfranchised with the political rewards. Iraqis, including the Awakening Councils, want peace and stability, but as in any form of participatory government, they also want power. In Diyala province recently, members of the Sons of Iraq abandoned their checkpoints in protest of the Iraqi central government’s choice for police chief, who happened to be Shiite. That’s just one minor example of the swelling tide of political discontent emerging from the Awakening Councils, as many simply see no purpose in continuing the fight as the Awakening came with few rewards. Adding to the complexity is the tenuous cease-fire by the fighters loyal to the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, who many of the Sawha forces fear.
Sources tell Reuters that "powerful Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is expected to extend a six-month ceasefire by his Mehdi Army militia."
This is great news. Moqtada al-Sadr's peacefire has been one of the reasons the surge has had such military success.
If he doesn't extend the ceasefire
If Sadr decides to end the ceasefire, contrary to Reuter's anonymous source's beliefs, the effect could be devastating.
Shiite on Shiite violence would flare up, as would Shiite on Sunni. New chaos would only slow the already snail-paced political action.
But why would Sadr want to reextend the truce?
A couple of reasons:
1. The U.S.
The United States has kept up pressure militarily and politically to hold Sadr down. The surge was one of the key reasons the Shiite cleric called for the ceasefire; once it began winding down, Sadr could have expected to be able to end his truce and not have to worry about too many Americans. There was a change: Defense secretary Robert Gates came out last month and said troop withdrawals could stop in the spring. This has probably given Sadr a lot to think about.
2. The Iraqi government
The Iraqi government has also kept up the pressure on al Sadr.
3. The Iraqi people
Let’s give the guy the benefit of the doubt: he’s looking for a peaceful solution without having too many casualties.
4. Iran
This, in my opinion, is the most interesting force possibly pushing al-Sadr to continue the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. and Iran have been having talks over Iraq for quite a while now, but no news has made it out of the talks. Have the two countries struck some sort of a deal? Even if they haven’t, is Iran looking to make a deal and holding al-Sadr back so one can be made?
It’s possible.
BBC: Italian PM Romano Prodi Resigns
It’s too bad that nobody cares.
Italy has lost all of its geopolitical influence to corruption and organized crime. It withdrew its soldiers from Afghanistan in 2006; it’s not involved in Iraq.
Let's pretend the U.S. pulled out of Iraq in the coming months because the President had a huge change of heart. 90% of our troops are gone, by, let's say July 2009.
What happens then?
Let's say, for the sake of discussion, all out civil war breaks out in Iraq, but is limited to that country.
Hundreds and thousands of Iraqis are dying every day, every week, every month. Does the U.S. have a moral obligation to step in and try to resolve the fighting?
Or instead, do we sit back and watch, and wait for the rest of the region to potentially join in?
I almost wrote the polar opposite of this article: John McCain, Surgin’ Back? He has a lot of bipartisan support, plenty of endorsements, was right about the surge, and is a solid conservative. The only thing missing is his unpopular immigration position and funds. But that’s the thing: McCain will never succeed because of his immigration position.
His poll numbers have been rising, sure, but as I’ve argued before, Republicans have no dream candidate. They are going through “fads”, almost.
But there’s an even broader issue here: immigration is showing up to be the most decisive primary election issue, more decisive than the Iraq war and terrorism even. One reason for this is that all candidates have expressed their positions on the war, and it’s turned out to be a matter of Republican or Democrat; Republicans want to stay (excluding Ron Paul), and Democrats want to leave.
There’s more than that: illegal immigration, many Americans feel, is actually affecting them on almost a day to day basis, unlike the Iraq war.
The other case that brings me to believe this is Clinton and driver's licenses. Her downturn in the polls started after her gaffe responding to the question of illegal immigrant's rights to driver licenses. She was really hit hard on her answer to that.
I think it’s fair to say that illegal immigration (along with the economy, which go hand in hand) will turn out to be the deciding factor during the primaries. It won’t necessarily be the most important, but it will be the deciding factor.
The general election?
Just as the Democrats have popular support for their plan to get out of Iraq, the Republicans will have popular support for their appearance of taking a “tough line” on illegal immigration.
So, a lot of it comes down to: are concerns over immigration more important than concerns over terrorism and foreign policy?
Days after I publish my analysis concluding the U.S. will use the NIE to work with Iran over Iraq... Well what do you know... More U.S., Iran talks next week
We’ve talked a lot about the recent National Intelligence Estimate, and rightly so. It is having a tremendous impact on U.S. foreign policy on the foreign policy of any great power. What we have not yet discussed is where we go from here.
In Iraq
As I’ve pointed out before, the NIE can be and most likely will be exploited as a tool to solve the crisis in Iraq. To summarize, the U.S. needs Iran on board to have a politically stable Iraq, and Iran needs the U.S. to allow Iran to influence events in Iraq in Iran’s favor. You might want to read that sentence twice. The biggest obstacle since negotiations have begun stopping the U.S. from getting what it wants has been Iran’s supposed nuclear weapons program. Iran has been using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip; if they surrender on the nuclear issue, they would expect to see concessions from the U.S. on the Iraq issue.
Now, the U.S. has a real chance to turn Iraq into a stable, democratic country that can be a model for the whole region. The U.S. could possibly even imagine achieving the goal of the Iraq invasion: a safe, friendly, democratic country in the Middle East. This possibility can only come into fruition if we continue negotiations with Iran over Iraq, and take advantage of the fact that now Iran has lost its biggest bargaining chip.
At the U.N.
Though the threat of Iran has appeared to diminish, the need for global political pressure is still necessary. Iran still has the capability, though no longer the intentions, to restart its weapons program and to build nuclear weapons. Therefore, the need for continuing pressure and sanctions is twofold: one, to ensure Iran does not restart its weapons program and two, to possibly coerce Iran into giving up its civilian nuclear program.
The need to guarantee Iran’s weapons program is never resurrected is self explanatory. We need to continue sanctions at the U.N. until Iran allows full open inspections of its facilities. Until then, there is always the possibility that Iran could restart its weapons program, and we cannot allow that to happen.
The reasoning behind compelling Iran to give up its civilian nuclear program is not as simple. The logic behind this requires an understanding of the broader Middle East and its countries. When it became public that Iran had worked on a nuclear weapons program at one time, the neighboring countries, especially those with majority Sunni populations, reacted with fear. The possibility of a regional arms race quickly became clear. This hit a high point in late 2006 when several regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, expressed ‘interest’ in nuclear power.
A world where the highly volatile region of the Middle East constantly has nuclear missiles pointing at each other would be unacceptable. As unacceptable as that would be to us westerners, Saudi Arabians would find a nuclear Iran even more unacceptable. Not only that, but it is unlikely Saudi Arabia, or any other Middle Eastern country, would find an Iran with civilian nuclear power any more bearable than an Iran with a nuclear weapon. A country often can claim it is developing civilian nuclear power, when in actuality, it is developing nuclear weapons, hidden from the eyes of U.N. and U.S. weapons inspectors.
And if there were to be a regional arms race?
If you thought a single country going nuclear was bad…
I would just like to say, as a disclaimer, that I have no experience in government intelligence or at think tanks or anything like that. Although, I do feel I have read enough news reports and enough news analysis so that I think I have a good feel for what's going on in the world.
Shane has questioned the basic thesis of my analysis: that the NIE report will be used in negotiations over Iraq. Let me say this: This isn't why the intelligence was produced, but how it will be used.
Also, the thesis makes perfect sense. The government could have hushed up the report and never had it released. Or, they could have had it released, but criticized and attacked it and ripped it to shreds. But they haven't.
More on the NIE:
On My NIE Analysis
[POLL] Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?
About time I wrote about this. Iran nuclear weapons report finally released, and says Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons program, etc., here comes the analysis.
It is important to consider the use of this report by the Bush Administration. Far lefties *cough* DAILY KOS *cough* have been milking this for all it’s worth. It’s a big dent in the Administration’s policy towards Iran, and the far right isn’t going to get a war with Iran. It’s huge. But in fact, I’d say this helps Bush more than it hurts him. Are you skeptic? You should be. But I won’t need a National Intelligence Estimate to convince you.
Uses by the Administration
1. To discredit Hillary Clinton based on her vote to classify the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as terrorists - HIGHLY UNLIKELY
2. To pass the problem of a nuclear Iran on to the next administration - UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE
3. As an excuse for NOT going to war with Iran - LIKELY
4. To take away Iran’s biggest bargaining chip - HIGHLY LIKELY
Iran’s biggest bargaining chip
As you can probably tell, numbers three and four are the most important. Number one I’d reserve for hardcore Clinton supporter conspiracy theorists.
We’ll start with use number four. To understand this, we have to take Iraq into the equation. Iraq is the President’s biggest concern right now. He may not show it in public, but it’s his biggest worry. It’s his legacy. He’s not going to be remembered for denuclearizing North Korea, or an attempt at Israeli-Palestinian peace. He’s going to be remembered for the invasions of both Afghanistan and the disastrous invasion of Iraq. And with little more than a year left in his presidency, it’s more on his mind than ever.
Consequently, he’s been working hard in order to improve the image of how successful the coalition of the willing has been in Iraq. He’s hired General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency expert, and has willfully engaged in talks with Middle Eastern states over the situation in Iraq. One of those states has been Iran.
Iran is crucial to the stabilization of Iraq. They have influence over much of the Shiite population, their leaders, and their weapons. It will be impossible to have even semi-stable state in Iraq without the support of Iran. The good news, Iran would love to see a friendly, stable Iraq under Shiite control. To get a friendly, stable, Shiite Iraq, Iran needs the U.S.
It may sound like a win-win situation, but like everything geopolitical, it’s not that simple in any way. It’s complicated by bad U.S.-Iran relations and uncooperative presidents on both sides. Iran wants a more Shiite dominated, Iranian influenced Iraq than the U.S. would care to give them. But Iran has had one huge bargaining chip the U.S. hasn’t been able to ignore: its nuclear weapons program.
Up until a few months ago, when the current NIE was being finalized, it appeared Iran had a weapons program (the last NIE thought the same). Iran didn’t mind; it gave them a huge bargaining chip. So, behind back doors, it played along.
But now Iran has lost this influence, because of this report. The U.S. could have the upper hand in Iraq negotiations, and Bush could receive a more favorable view from historians than even appeared possible six months ago.
Use number three, “an excuse for not going to war with Iran,” has just as much to do with Bush’s legacy as use number three. A third war on the president’s report card would be given an ‘F’ by historians, and could possibly an expulsion (read: impeachment) by the school administrators even before that.
Of course, this is a very oversimplified version of the situation. There are many more players involved: Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc.
Effects
Now that we’re done with all that, it’s probably a pretty good idea to see the consequences of the report. These, compared to the reasoning for the report, are simple.
1. Repercussions at U.S.-Iran discussions over Iraq (as discussed above)
2. Allies less likely to pursue sanctions at the U.N. (specifically Russia and China)
3. Virtually no chance of war with Iran
4. Cheney very disappointed (just kidding)
It will be interesting to see how this plays out in the months ahead.
On My NIE Analysis
Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?
As the United States works towards peace in the Middle East, one country is threatening stabilization. Who? One of America’s greatest allies: Turkey.
The ruling Turkish party, the AK Party, said it would request the Turkish Parliament’s authorization for a ‘major incursion’, according to Reuters.
The government there has come under increasing pressure, as the PKK rebel group has stepped up its attacks in the country.
A brief history lesson
The PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers Party, is a Kurdish nationalist group listed as a terrorist organization by a number of states and organizations, including the U.S., NATO, and the E.U. The PKK’s goal is an independent, socialist Kurdish state encompassing northern Iraq, south east Turkey, west Iran, and parts of north east Syria. It has no qualms against using violence to obtain its objectives.
Turkey has a large minority of Kurds, who feel that they have been treated as second-rate citizens since the creation of modern Turkey in 1923. The PKK has fought a deadly guerilla war since the 1970s that has claimed over 37,000 lives.
Around the year 2000, following the capture of its leader, the PKK suspended military operations and called for a truce. This truce ended in 2004, and since then, the paramilitary group has increased the ferocity and frequency of its attacks.
Oct 7: PKK fighters killed 13 Turkish soldiers, including 1 officer, after Turkish soldiers shot dead a suspected PKK fighter earlier in the day.
Jun 13: 4 Turkish soldiers killed in multiple attacks.
Jun 10: A bomb in Istanbul wounds 14 Turkish civilians. The PKK is suspected.
Jun 7: 3 Turkish soldiers are killed by a PKK landmine.
Jun 4: A PKK suicide bomber kills 8 soldiers and wound 6 at an army checkpoint.
May 22: A suicide bombing hits Ankara killing 9 and wounding over 100. While no one claims responsibility the PKK is blamed by the government.
The effects of a Turkish invasion
Obviously, a Turkish invasion would be destabilizing, especially with the size of the incursion Turkey is currently considering. It is worth taking into consideration that Turkey would like to see a powerful central government in Iraq to keep the Kurds and the PKK under control. It is also important to note that an invasion would most likely be most disruptive in the Kurdish region, where it is already peaceful, which means it would most likely not inflame Sunni-Shia tensions.
What should Turkey do?
It is in Turkey’s best interest to invade, but in the worst interests of the Bush Administration. A Turkish invasion would be a huge setback for the Administration. Sadly, there is very little the U.S. can do to stop Turkey. They have been a very close ally, but since the Iraq war, relations have cooled. Not so much as that the U.S. has no influence over what goes on in Turkey, but the Bush Administration has already spent the last 3 years trying to stop Turkey from sending in troops. If Turkey and its new president have decided they finally want to go and attempt to wipe out the PKK, the U.S. may be unable to stop them.
As the British withdraw from Basra, we here in America are struggling to find a way to meet our goals in Iraq.
There have been many proposed solutions, but there are no good options; each plan to fix or to get out of Iraq contains serious flaws.
Our strategic objective in Iraq since the start of the war has been to create pro-American coalition government in Baghdad. The original Rumsfeld plan was to go in, create some degree of stability while training the Iraqis to pacify Iraq. We would then withdraw leaving the rest of the nation building to the Iraqis.
It didn’t work.
The options
We now have 3 options available. The first is to maintain the current strategy. This is the Bush Administration’s point of view. The second is a rapid withdrawal of forces, a position held by a fairly small group mostly on the left. The third is to start a phased withdrawal, beginning sometime in the next few months and concluding when circumstances allow. This is the consensus among most moderate Democrats and a growing number of Republicans. All three options, however, suffer from fatal defects.
Bush’s plan for staying the course makes very little sense. We have tried this option for 4 years now, and it has not been successful. As they say, trying the same method twice and expecting different results is the definition of insanity.
But there is an argument for this case. The Bush Administration, as do the plan’s supporters, argue that this plan should continue indefinitely in order to avoid a more dangerous outcome: an Iranian controlled Middle East.
There is no question that if the U.S. were to withdraw, there would be a major power vacuum in the Middle East. Who else to fill that vacuum but Iran? Saudi Arabia does not have the military might to stand up to Iran.
But you must consider the defects of this approach. The army is near the breaking point and morale is low at home. The cost of this approach, in money and lives, will continue to rise.
The second option is a phased withdrawal. This appears to be the most reasonable, moderate proposal. But consider this: if the mission were to remain the same – fight the insurgents and train the Iraqi army in order to increase security – then we would be doing the same job with fewer troops, and still maintaining casualties. Fewer casualties, but nevertheless American injuries and deaths.
Only under a different strategic goal would phased withdrawal make sense. Most likely, that redefined goal would be dealing with Iran. But under the same strategic goal the U.S. has been pursuing since the start of the war, phased withdrawal is the least defensible strategy.
Championed by presidential candidate Bill Richardson, the third option is an immediate pullout. If we are to withdraw, this plan would be more attractive than a phased withdrawal; it achieves the same ends without the casualties.
The flaw of this strategy is that it opens the door for Iran to dominate Iraq. The only power in the region that could have any chance of stopping the Iranians is the Turks, and Turkey has no problem with a controlled Kurdish population.
Sunnis, Kurds and even some Shiites would resist Iran. But Iraq is much more important to Iran than it is to the U.S., and the authoritarian Iranian theocracy has a much higher pain resistance than the U.S.
The situation would be an extraordinary opportunity for the Iranians; they would be knocking on Saudi Arabia’s door. The Saudis don’t have the military might to stop Iran, and Saudi Arabia could be forced into a political agreement with the Iranians. Iran could even influence Saudi oil. The whole Arabian Peninsula would be threatened.
All three conventional options, therefore, contain serious flaws. Continuing the current strategy pursues an unattainable goal. Staged withdrawal exposes fewer U.S. troops to more aggressive enemy action. Rapid withdrawal quickly opens the door for possible regional Iranian hegemony -- and lays a large part of the world's oil reserves at Iran's feet.
Changing the objective
We have three approaches, each with imperfections. The solution is to change the strategic goal.
The obvious choice for America’s new objective is the prevention of an Iranian hegemony. Besides creating a stable, pro-American government in Iraq, what is in our national interest in the Middle East? To stop anti-American forces. Expanded Iranian power will not help American interests in the Middle East or around the globe.
The U.S. cannot control the populace of Iraq. The U.S. has never been a great counterinsurgency force, but we remain a great conventional force. Therefore, we still have the ability to stop Iran. We could position our forces in Saudi Arabia, but the last time that happened, we helped sparked the rise of Islamic terrorism. The best remaining areas are Kurdistan and Kuwait.
Residual U.S. forces would be left in Kurdistan and Kuwait to keep Iran under control. This would allow for a rebuilding of the military and a reduction of American casualties.
Since all three conventional options are flawed, this is the only way out. We leave on our own terms, with fewer casualties, with our national honor. We would have a chance to rebuild the military, and a chance to salvage our interests in the Middle East.
Has the War in Iraq helped the War in Afghanistan?
An outrageous claim, but think about it; many terrorists are now in Iraq, fighting us there, instead of fighting us in Afghanistan.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Islamists came down on the occupiers hard. Now, the U.S. is meeting comparatively less resistance.
The ‘Al-Qaeda’ that is not in hiding is probably concentrating their firepower in Iraq. It would make sense, n’est-ce pas?
But there’s another side to the argument. Iraq has drawn huge amounts of resources away from Afghanistan. Troops, funding and public interest are just a few.
It comes down to opinion: is the number of terrorists possibly kept out of Iraq more or less important than the loss of troops, funding and public interest.
I'd probably say Iraq has hurt the War in Afghanistan, but that's my opinion. Feel free to tell yours.