Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Friday, August 22, 2008

Deal Would Have the US Out of Iraq by 2012 - A Good Plan

NYT: Draft Accord With Iraq Sets Goal of 2011 Pullout

Note

I cannot fully write about this yet because of the fact that the agreement has not been released, and I don’t know if the full treaty will every fully be released. However: details will continue to come in, and as they do, I will write new articles.

A good plan
United States and Iraqi negotiators have been haggling over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for several months now. Up until now, the international military presence in Iraq has been legitimized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This new agreement will last three years and its main points are this:

1. U.S. troops must move outside of cities by June 30, 2009
2. Withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the end of December 31, 2011
3. No immunity for private contractors
4. Some immunity for American soldiers (immunity if on base or on duty)
5. A failsafe in case Iraq collapses

This plan is much better than either plan submitted by the two presidential contenders: McCain would stay too long (forever), Obama too short (16 months). This plan does not have the drawbacks of either.

Michael Cohen over at Democracy Arsenal and in the WSJ today argues that no immunity for private contractors will impede on their ability to do their duty properly in Iraq. That is not true for at least two reasons:
1. Any private contractors put on trial that didn’t really do anything wrong will not be convicted; U.S. pressure will assure to that.
2. Because the Iraqi government was so strong about putting this resolution in the agreement, the government gains legitimacy among the Iraqi people. Maliki, in particular, looks extra-nationalist and therefore extra popular.

On Iran

I’ve noticed a lack of discussion about Iran on this. I’m waiting to see Iran’s reaction to this (and consequently the reaction of Muqtada al-Sadr). I'll keep y'all posted.

On the Sunni Awakening
The NYT is also reporting that the Shiite-led Iraqi government is refusing to incorporate the 100,000 strong Sunni Awakening – Sunnis paid by the U.S. to take up arms against Al-Qaeda and other insurgents. It is vital that the al-Maliki government incorporates the Sunnis into the government. It is impossible to state the importance of this enough. If they are not incorporated, I fear a resumption of the civil war and a strengthening of the insurgency.

Thursday, June 26, 2008

China, Iran, and the Denuclearization of North Korea

IHT: U.S. to remove North Korea from terror list

Background
As part of a denuclearization deal, North Korea today handed over 60 pages of information on its nuclear power and nuclear weapons program. The move was an important step in the process of the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program. In return, President Bush announced that his administration would remove the country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and end some sanctions ‘symbolically’.

As said above, this action was only a part of a major denuclearization deal. The agreement came as a result of direct negotiations with North Korea in early 2007 under a new policy from the Bush Administration. The previous policy had limited engagement with North Korea, and stressed isolation and sanctions. However, in 2006, the President defied hawks in his administration and enacted a new policy towards the North, launching full fledged talks with North Korea: 6 party negotiations between North Korea, the host China, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Russia. North Korea was slow with following through on its promises, but it eventually came through with today’s declaration of plutonium capabilities, which will be verified by the United States in the coming weeks.

Information not yet disclosed

Significantly, the North's declaration is not expected to disclose details on three critical points: the nuclear bombs the North has already produced; its alleged attempts to produce nuclear arms by secretly enriching uranium, which brought on the current crisis in 2002; and accusations that the North had helped Syria build a nuclear plant.

These details need to be disclosed as the next step in the denuclearization process. The information, especially on Syria, is vital

The role of China
From everything I’ve read, China has played a big role in getting Kim Jong-Il to agree to the denuclearization process. Some analysts have gone as far as to say that North Korea would not even have agreed to disarm if weren’t for Beijing. Let’s take a look at China’s motives for a second. Why would they be interested in getting rid of a key piece of leverage they could use against the United States? It comes down to regional stability. China is experiencing rapid economic growth, and it doesn’t want anything to slow it down. As well, Beijing doesn’t want anything to ruin its ‘coming out party’ at the Olympics in August. This has been seen even this week when China allowed a Japanese naval vessel to dock at its ports for the first time since WWII.

Moral of the story: one major reason denuclearization in North Korea has been possible is because of China.

The problem with denuclearization in Iran
North Korea shows us two problems with American policy towards Iran. One, we are not negotiating with the Iranian regime. Two, we have no partner in the region that has significant leverage over Tehran. Some might say, hey, Saudi Arabia could pressure Iran. But why would Riyadh want to? Sure, the country wants to prevent any new wars in the region that might disrupt their oil shipments. But besides that, tensions in the region are only good for Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Iranian tensions have only helped send oil prices to new highs.

So, why does it matter?
Well, it doesn’t really. I just wanted to point that out. But there is one significant lesson we can take from the North Korean denuclearization: negotiations work.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Prisoner Swap with Hezbollah, Truce in Gaza - Rumblings in the Middle East

CNN: Israeli Cabinet to consider swap with Hezbollah
BBC: Rockets ‘violated Gaza ceasefire’
Reuters: More indirect Israel, Syria talks in July

Background

Israel has been negotiating on two and a half fronts recently. The first front is in the Palestinian territories, but specifically with Hamas in Gaza. The second and a half negotiations were with Hezbollah/Lebanon along with Syria.

Negotiations with Hamas have been ongoing since the 2006 abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and after the 2007 coup in which Hamas ousted its rival Fatah and took over the Gaza Strip. The eventual result was a ceasefire for Gaza which began Thursday. No one expected the truce to last long, however. That assertion was only confirmed today when Islamic Jihad militants launched rockets into southern Israel in retaliation for an Israeli air strike in the West Bank, which, if you don’t remember, is not part of the truce.

The second front has been much more interesting, not to mention more peaceful (albeit just for now, but we’ll get into that later). Israel and Syria have finally gotten around to having negotiations over the disputed Golan Heights that Israel captured in the 6 Day War. The talks, which are being mediated by the Turks, have not been completely endorsed by the U.S., which has complicated things, and even led one Israeli general to declare that there will be no deal with Syria until George Bush is out of office.

On the other half of that negotiating front is Lebanon and Hezbollah – Israel has opened up negotiations with both. Why include Lebanon/Hezbollah and Syria together? There can be no peace between Israel and Syria without involving Lebanon and Hezbollah, and there can be no peace between Israel and Hezbollah without involving Syria. Besides, Syria still has de facto control over many parts of the country. This is for many political, religious, and economic reasons, but it is also because Syria has a big hand in the actions of Hezbollah. Well, it appears Syria has given the go ahead for some peace between Israel and Hezbollah: a prisoner swap. Two soldiers captured in 2006 by Hezbollah would be traded for a rumored five Hezbollah guerrillas.

So, to sum up an unnecessarily long background:
- Israel is negotiating with Hamas for peace in Gaza and the return of a captured soldier
- Israel is negotiating with Syria over a peace agreement on the Golan Heights
- Israel is negotiating with Hezbollah, which is supported by Syria, for the return of two captured Israeli soldiers

Peace in Gaza

One thing not mentioned above was the almost imminent incursion that would have surely taken place if it hadn’t been for the ceasefire. Rocket fire had gone on for far too long without the Israeli government truly responding for most Israelis tastes. Therefore, Israel should take this truce as an opportunity to do three things: (a) prepare its military, if necessary, for an incursion; (b) bolster Fatah in the West Bank; (c) open up final peace negotiations with Hamas. If those negotiations failed, and rocket attacks resumed, options a and b would be ready for retaliation against Hamas

Peace in Lebanon

The prisoner swap should go through, and the United States needs to endorse a peace deal between Syria and Israel. Peace is in the interests of all the above countries – Israel would like peace and its ruling politicians any victories; a deal on the Golan Heights has been said to be the ‘number one foreign policy issue’ for Syria; and a peace deal between Israel and Syria would undermine American archenemy Iran.

Political turmoil in Israel
The ruling coalition in Israel has been hit by a number of corruption scandals. Early elections seem likely. However, early elections could put more extreme parties, including the Likud party of right wing hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu. Any successes in Lebanon, Syria, or the Palestinian territories would greatly bolster the current, moderate administration. That would be in our best interests.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Shiites Blamed for Bombing of Other Shiites - Iran?

Reuters: U.S. blames Shi'ite group ... for bombing and killing of 63 Shiites

Sure, it's easy to see they're trying to stir up sectarian violence. But if your sect is that important, why not blow up some Sunnis instead of your own Shiites? 3 possibilities:

1. It was accident.
2. Religion isn't as important in Iraq as it's made out to be. Or maybe the situation has evolved to that state.
3. The special Shiite cell was from Iran and didn't care so much for Iraqi Shiites.

Option 3 seems the most likely, for several reasons. See: Europe announces new Iranian sanctions during Bush visit

Monday, May 26, 2008

U.S, Iran, Neighbors Meet Over Iraq

Reuters: U.S., Iran and Arab neighbors to meet on Iraq

This will be the first time Iranian and American negotiators will (publicly) be in the same room since talks over Iraqi security have been suspended. The U.S. should take this chance to publicly say:
1. That a peaceful Iraq will not be possible without Iran
2. Iran should stop arming Shiite militias
3. A stable Iraq is in the interests of Iran and the Sunni countries of the region

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Will Israel Trade the Golan Heights for Peace with Syria?

BBC: Israel ready to return Golan Heights to Syria

Background
The Golan Heights is an a mountainous region in north east Israel that the Jewish state captured in the 1967 Six Day War from Syria and successfully defended in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. A portion of the land was returned to Syria in later years.

There has long been talk of eventual Israeli return of the land to Syrian control in exchange for peace. Indirect talks mediated by Turkey have picked up pace recently.

Recent events
There have been several recent events that are very interesting.
1. The bombing of Syria’s supposed nuclear reactor
2. North Korean nuclear progress
3. Congressional briefing on possible Syrian-North Korean nuclear ties
4. Syrian military on alert
5. Israeli military on alert
6. The assassination of Imad Mughniyeh

Last September, Israeli jets bombed a building in Syria. The event was completely surrounded in mystery, with many leaks and sources pointing to the conclusion that the building was a nuclear facility. Other facts indicated Syria got this technology from North Korea. A select group of Congressional officials is being briefed on that possibility today, with all leaks saying the answer was yes.

Months later, Imad Mughniyeh, a top ranking Hezbollah official, was assassinated. The likely culprit: Israel. Then, even more recently, both the Israeli and Syrian militaries were put on alert. Some analysts believed Israel was watching for a Hezbollah assassination, and Syria was just being careful. More interestingly, rumors swirled about another Israel-Syria war.

Was this Israel’s attempt at preventing a conflict? Prime Minister Olmert already suffered through one unpopular war in Lebanon in 2006; it’s unlikely he’d survive another war.

Anyway, where does Syria’s nuclear reactor fit in? Well, the timing of the briefing and of Israel’s extension of the olive branch cannot be any coincidence. Syria could be forgiven for its nuclear crime as part of the deal.

What should we do now?
Israeli return of the Golan Heights for peace does not sound like a bad idea for either side. If Israel can juice the thing for everything its worth, I’m sure we could convince Syria to disassociate itself with Iran, or to some degree.

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Will the Arming of Sunni Militias in Iraq Pressure Iran?

Daniel Graeber has an interesting article in UPI (h/t) on the long term consequences of arming Sunni militias in Iraq.

But as the Sons of Iraq increasingly shed blood for the country, they are growing increasingly disenfranchised with the political rewards. Iraqis, including the Awakening Councils, want peace and stability, but as in any form of participatory government, they also want power. In Diyala province recently, members of the Sons of Iraq abandoned their checkpoints in protest of the Iraqi central government’s choice for police chief, who happened to be Shiite. That’s just one minor example of the swelling tide of political discontent emerging from the Awakening Councils, as many simply see no purpose in continuing the fight as the Awakening came with few rewards. Adding to the complexity is the tenuous cease-fire by the fighters loyal to the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, who many of the Sawha forces fear.

I had Graeber's way of thinking until last week. Then I had a realization: what if the danger of arming the Sunnis was intentional? Why would anyone in their right mind do that, you may (rightfully) ask. Well, who is the United State's number one rival in the Middle East right now? Shiite Iran. Emphasis on the whole Shiite part.

Armed Sunni militias would make Iran's goal of puppeteering Iraq much, much harder for obvious reasons.

Not only that, but Iran really, really, really does not want to see the Sunnis rise up again in Iraq. The Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s resulted in the deaths of up to a million of the youngest and brightest Iranian men. Now, I'm not suggesting that Iraq would enter another conflict with Iraq, but this is still scary stuff for Iran.

Was this the Bush Administration’s intention? I have no way to know. All I know is that this is one of the consequences that we are going to have to deal with in the coming years.

Of course, there are still the many dangerous consequences Graeber mentions. For example, he and I both noticed the frightening similarities between our arming of Sunni militias now and our arming of the Afghani mujahedin during the Cold War.

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Nominating a New CENTCOM Chief

Background
It has just been announced that the commander of CENTCOM, the command that overseas the Middle East, Admiral Fallon, has resigned. This comes a week after a story was published in Esquire that portrayed Fallon as the only person stopping the President from going to war with Iran. In a press conference today, Robert Gates denied that those perceptions are true, but of course, you can't believe that for certain.

Choosing a new chief
Congress needs to quickly approve or deny any nomination President Bush puts forward based on a couple of their key beliefs: their position on Iraq policy, Iran policy and how diplomatic they would be. Congress must nominate a moderate who can, on occasion, stand up to the Bush Administration and their sometimes radical policy.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Russia Toughens Stance on Iran - Why?

Reuters: Russia warns Iran over nuclear program

This is a strange move of sorts from Russia. The Kremlin has always been reluctant to impose sanctions on Iran, and have been only more reluctant since the infamous National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear capabilities came out at the end of last year. Why the change in the position?

Recent events
Did any recent events provoke Russi into making this move?
• Kosovo independence (and Russia’s inability to prevent it)?
• Upcoming Russian elections?
• The recently released IAEA Iran report (which eased some pressure on Iran)?

None of these events seem a likely impetus for Russia’s actions, for mostly obvious reasons:
• Why would Russia want another geopolitical loss after Kosovo?
• Putin is expected to stay in power in elections anyway.
• The IAEA report made Iran look like the good guy.

Another possibility
It is quite possible the White House made a deal with Russia and Putin to move forward with sanctions. The details such a compromise would entail can only be guessed at.

Russia looking to provoke Iran?
Though this is more of a conspiracy theory like idea, it cannot be ruled out. The U.S. and Iran have been engaged in talks for a while now, and could be nearing a deal. By threatening to agree to new sanctions, the former superpower could turn up the heat on Iran, which could aggravate Iran, causing Tehran to cancel any deal it might have worked out with the U.S.

What should the U.S. do?
The U.S. has a fairly easy decision to make, from my point of view. If talks with Iran are producing results, sanctions should be delayed. If talks are going no where, hat tip Moscow and pursue further sanctions.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Kosovo Independence: Russia-Serbia Relations and Russian Reaction

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on Sunday, ending months of waiting. The U.S. and most other NATO nations already have or will to recognize the nation as a sovereign state. This has all been expected for months, but there are multiple variables that could change, all depending on the reaction of one country: Russia.

Background – Putin’s interest in the region

The Russian government has let the world know that it does not approve of an independent Kosovo. But why does Russia even have an interest in the region? To understand we need to travel back to rough times in Russia.

Vladimir Putin took over the Russian Federation just before the turn of the twentieth century, after the economically devastating rule of President Gorbachev. Russia was weak, and the citizens of Russia didn’t like it. They had been the strongest nation on Earth, in power with the United States, for 50 years. And they wanted that prestige and influence back. Russia was sliding down a nasty slope.

So along comes Putin. The former KGB agent is ‘elected’, and takes hold of the Russian Bear, stops it, and swings it around in the opposite direction. Well, that is what he would have you think. It will suffice to say that during Putin’s reign, life for the average Russian improved. With the improvement of the everyday Russian’s life, so came improvements for Russia’s power abroad. The country is once again strong, and still getting stronger.

The Russian bear has once again gained enormous influence over its satellites. It has gained much of this power by promising to protect its satellites and their interests better than the West can. This strategy has been the central doctrine of Moscow’s regional policy since Putin took power.

Along comes Serbia. Although never part of the U.S.S.R., Serbia, deep in Eastern Europe, has always fallen under Russian influence. Essentially, Russia wants Serbia to look to Russia for help rather than the West. This is why Russia has been against Kosovoan independence. If the Russians can successfully stop the West from allowing Kosovo to secede from Serbia, Russia looks stronger than the West.

In other words, Vladimir is proving himself (and Russia) to Serbia. But Russia is not only demonstrating its recently regained influence to Serbia; Putin has staked a great deal of his political reputation on stopping Kosovo from gaining independence. He is proving Russia’s power to the rest of the world.

Russia’s reaction
100 hours have passed since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. So far, we have seen a limited reaction from Russia; nothing more than more diplomatic protests than usual. Russia doesn’t have a wide range of choices. Military action is an unlikely possibility because of geographic problems and for geopolitical reasons. A trade embargo would seem to be likely, but would be totally ineffective. Of course, Moscow could declare a trade embargo anyways, in a largely symbolic move. But other than that, Putin has three moves.

Two breakaway regions in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could be recognized as independent or even absorbed by Russia. The two nation’s desire for independence has long been backed by Moscow, and Georgia has always been a thorn right on the border of Russia. Half of the country swallowed up by another would surely cause disruption. Russia would point to this action and say, hey, if you can change borders, so can you.

A second strategy might involve disrupting the West’s interests. In retaliation for the recognition of Kosovo, Russia could create problems at the United Nations Security Council. A potential target could be the third round of sanctions for Iran. This is the most likely Russian response.

This third approach is the most bizarre: do nothing. Putin has known the independence would come, and there’s not a lot he can do about it. If he were to stand back and watch the United States and the European Union control the situation, it would be very, very bad geopolitically for Moscow. They would look horrendously weak in front of the former Soviet Union, the West, and the rest of the world.

What should the U.S. do?
Now that Kosovo has been recognized, the United States no problems besides Russia. If Russia’s actions can be successfully contained, this whole Kosovo incident can be a good memory for everyone. Well, except for the Russians of course.

The United States has the most worry at the U.N.; that is where the most damage would be taken, and Russia’s most likely reaction. How can the U.S. prevent this damage from being taken? The Bush Administration will have to make concessions in other areas if they wish for the Iranian sanctions to pass.

A smarter strategy might have been adopted before Kosovo declared independence: pass sanctions before Kosovo declared independence.

It doesn’t matter now. It is time to look forward, and to develop a new strategy for dealing with the Russians in Eastern Europe.

Good News: Sadr to Extend Ceasefire?

Sources tell Reuters that "powerful Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is expected to extend a six-month ceasefire by his Mehdi Army militia."

This is great news. Moqtada al-Sadr's peacefire has been one of the reasons the surge has had such military success.

If he doesn't extend the ceasefire
If Sadr decides to end the ceasefire, contrary to Reuter's anonymous source's beliefs, the effect could be devastating.

Shiite on Shiite violence would flare up, as would Shiite on Sunni. New chaos would only slow the already snail-paced political action.

But why would Sadr want to reextend the truce?
A couple of reasons:
1. The U.S.
The United States has kept up pressure militarily and politically to hold Sadr down. The surge was one of the key reasons the Shiite cleric called for the ceasefire; once it began winding down, Sadr could have expected to be able to end his truce and not have to worry about too many Americans. There was a change: Defense secretary Robert Gates came out last month and said troop withdrawals could stop in the spring. This has probably given Sadr a lot to think about.
2. The Iraqi government
The Iraqi government has also kept up the pressure on al Sadr.
3. The Iraqi people
Let’s give the guy the benefit of the doubt: he’s looking for a peaceful solution without having too many casualties.
4. Iran
This, in my opinion, is the most interesting force possibly pushing al-Sadr to continue the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. and Iran have been having talks over Iraq for quite a while now, but no news has made it out of the talks. Have the two countries struck some sort of a deal? Even if they haven’t, is Iran looking to make a deal and holding al-Sadr back so one can be made?

It’s possible.

Monday, January 21, 2008

What do New Iranian Sanctions Mean?

BBC: Iran sanctions accord 'imminent'

These would be the first sanctions after the last National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear activities, and the first after the infamous Strait of Hormuz incident.

The chance of sanctions be successfully applied will depend on China and Russia’s willingness to press Iran further after the NIE.

U.S. intentions
These sanctions are intended to pressure Iran to answer vital questions about its nuclear program. Iran has promised to do this, but one can expect the usual responses.

Iranian response

Will this provoke Iran or will this further compel the Islamic state to give up its program? If sanctions are passed, this will most definitely pressure Iran by showing the world’s unity against its nuclear program, especially understanding that the sanctions would come after the NIE.

Effect on Iranian elections
Legislative elections are coming in March. Will this have an effect? I don’t know enough about Iranian politics to make a very well informed prediction.

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

Cash Money

Days after I publish my analysis concluding the U.S. will use the NIE to work with Iran over Iraq... Well what do you know... More U.S., Iran talks next week

Monday, December 10, 2007

Iran and the NIE: Where We Go From Here

We’ve talked a lot about the recent National Intelligence Estimate, and rightly so. It is having a tremendous impact on U.S. foreign policy on the foreign policy of any great power. What we have not yet discussed is where we go from here.

In Iraq
As I’ve pointed out before, the NIE can be and most likely will be exploited as a tool to solve the crisis in Iraq. To summarize, the U.S. needs Iran on board to have a politically stable Iraq, and Iran needs the U.S. to allow Iran to influence events in Iraq in Iran’s favor. You might want to read that sentence twice. The biggest obstacle since negotiations have begun stopping the U.S. from getting what it wants has been Iran’s supposed nuclear weapons program. Iran has been using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip; if they surrender on the nuclear issue, they would expect to see concessions from the U.S. on the Iraq issue.

Now, the U.S. has a real chance to turn Iraq into a stable, democratic country that can be a model for the whole region. The U.S. could possibly even imagine achieving the goal of the Iraq invasion: a safe, friendly, democratic country in the Middle East. This possibility can only come into fruition if we continue negotiations with Iran over Iraq, and take advantage of the fact that now Iran has lost its biggest bargaining chip.

At the U.N.
Though the threat of Iran has appeared to diminish, the need for global political pressure is still necessary. Iran still has the capability, though no longer the intentions, to restart its weapons program and to build nuclear weapons. Therefore, the need for continuing pressure and sanctions is twofold: one, to ensure Iran does not restart its weapons program and two, to possibly coerce Iran into giving up its civilian nuclear program.

The need to guarantee Iran’s weapons program is never resurrected is self explanatory. We need to continue sanctions at the U.N. until Iran allows full open inspections of its facilities. Until then, there is always the possibility that Iran could restart its weapons program, and we cannot allow that to happen.

The reasoning behind compelling Iran to give up its civilian nuclear program is not as simple. The logic behind this requires an understanding of the broader Middle East and its countries. When it became public that Iran had worked on a nuclear weapons program at one time, the neighboring countries, especially those with majority Sunni populations, reacted with fear. The possibility of a regional arms race quickly became clear. This hit a high point in late 2006 when several regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, expressed ‘interest’ in nuclear power.

A world where the highly volatile region of the Middle East constantly has nuclear missiles pointing at each other would be unacceptable. As unacceptable as that would be to us westerners, Saudi Arabians would find a nuclear Iran even more unacceptable. Not only that, but it is unlikely Saudi Arabia, or any other Middle Eastern country, would find an Iran with civilian nuclear power any more bearable than an Iran with a nuclear weapon. A country often can claim it is developing civilian nuclear power, when in actuality, it is developing nuclear weapons, hidden from the eyes of U.N. and U.S. weapons inspectors.

And if there were to be a regional arms race?

If you thought a single country going nuclear was bad…

Sunday, December 09, 2007

On My NIE Analysis

I would just like to say, as a disclaimer, that I have no experience in government intelligence or at think tanks or anything like that. Although, I do feel I have read enough news reports and enough news analysis so that I think I have a good feel for what's going on in the world.

Shane has questioned the basic thesis of my analysis: that the NIE report will be used in negotiations over Iraq. Let me say this: This isn't why the intelligence was produced, but how it will be used.

Also, the thesis makes perfect sense. The government could have hushed up the report and never had it released. Or, they could have had it released, but criticized and attacked it and ripped it to shreds. But they haven't.

More on the NIE:
On My NIE Analysis
[POLL] Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

[POLL] Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?

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On My NIE Analysis
Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

Saturday, December 08, 2007

Why The NIE Should Be Trusted

I'm willing to trust the report for two reasons:
1. It was approved by the DNI, who in turn was appointed by the President
2. It doesn't make sense that Iran would have a nuclear program

I will elaborate more on the second. As I've argued before, as did the NIE, Iran is guided by 'cost-benefit analysis'. In an attempt to build a nuclear weapon, they would have to recognize, before it was completed, the program would be attacked and most likely destroyed bye either the U.S. or Israel. And Iran, guided by 'cost-benefit analysis' would realize it does not have the military might to stop an attack.

From this, one can draw the logical conclusion that Iran would only build a nuclear weapons program because it wants the U.S. or Israel to attack. One reason could be is that they need a reason to strike at Israel. This argument cannot stand because, first of all, Iran would not be able to carry out the attack. The U.S. and/or Israel would first take out major military installations so that Iran cannot retaliate. And even if Iran could retaliate, it would spell doom. A U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear weapons would only take out nuclear and military installations. Iran - if they could - in retaliation,would be sure to strike civilian centers. The U.S. and/or Israel would then wipe Iran 'off the map'. And if Iran is basing its decisions off of 'cost-benefit analysis', they would realize this, and would never retaliate.

The only other reason Iran would build a nuclear weapons program, other than looking for a fight (which we just proved makes no sense), is that they would be looking for a North Korea-like deal. They would expect some economic or geopolitical aid in return for the shutdown of weapons.

Iran is different from North Korea. In North Korea, they had already spent a huge amount of money developing their weapons program. Iran hasn't. North Korea wasn't planning from the beginning to ask for economic aid in return for its weapons program. It was planning to use its weapons program as a threat against South Korea. Also, North Korea is ruled by a crackpot dictator who loves attention. If Iran is basing its work on 'cost-benefit' analysis, the cost is much different from North Korea's cost. The benefit would not outweigh the cost in Iran's case, unlike in North Korea's case.

Iran could be looking for 'geopolitical aid' in return for the shutdown of its weapons program. But once again, the benefits do not outweigh the costs. The 'geopolitical aid' Iran would receive from the U.S. would almost definitely be in Iraq. Iran would be given more influence there. But the geopolitical cost of even having a nuclear weapons program would be huge.

And remember, MOST IMPORTANTLY, the U.S. never has to give Iran any aid at all. The U.S. could just say, "Nope, we're not giving you anything," and give Israel the go ahead to blow up Natanz and other nuclear facilities. That would mean Iran gets a negative return. They spend all their resources building facilities, and in return, get their infrastructure destroyed.

Is it worth the cost? No.


On My NIE Analysis
Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

The Significance of the NIE

I left this out of the first post on this topic, so I'll include it now.

The significance of this report is not that we can stop pressuring Iran, but 2 different points:
1. Going to war with Iran would be pointless and dumb.
2. Iran is guided by 'cost-benefit analysis'. They're vulnerable to international economic and political pressure.

On My NIE Analysis
Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

Thursday, December 06, 2007

How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

About time I wrote about this. Iran nuclear weapons report finally released, and says Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons program, etc., here comes the analysis.

It is important to consider the use of this report by the Bush Administration. Far lefties *cough* DAILY KOS *cough* have been milking this for all it’s worth. It’s a big dent in the Administration’s policy towards Iran, and the far right isn’t going to get a war with Iran. It’s huge. But in fact, I’d say this helps Bush more than it hurts him. Are you skeptic? You should be. But I won’t need a National Intelligence Estimate to convince you.

Uses by the Administration

1. To discredit Hillary Clinton based on her vote to classify the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as terrorists - HIGHLY UNLIKELY
2. To pass the problem of a nuclear Iran on to the next administration - UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE
3. As an excuse for NOT going to war with Iran - LIKELY
4. To take away Iran’s biggest bargaining chip - HIGHLY LIKELY

Iran’s biggest bargaining chip
As you can probably tell, numbers three and four are the most important. Number one I’d reserve for hardcore Clinton supporter conspiracy theorists.

We’ll start with use number four. To understand this, we have to take Iraq into the equation. Iraq is the President’s biggest concern right now. He may not show it in public, but it’s his biggest worry. It’s his legacy. He’s not going to be remembered for denuclearizing North Korea, or an attempt at Israeli-Palestinian peace. He’s going to be remembered for the invasions of both Afghanistan and the disastrous invasion of Iraq. And with little more than a year left in his presidency, it’s more on his mind than ever.

Consequently, he’s been working hard in order to improve the image of how successful the coalition of the willing has been in Iraq. He’s hired General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency expert, and has willfully engaged in talks with Middle Eastern states over the situation in Iraq. One of those states has been Iran.

Iran is crucial to the stabilization of Iraq. They have influence over much of the Shiite population, their leaders, and their weapons. It will be impossible to have even semi-stable state in Iraq without the support of Iran. The good news, Iran would love to see a friendly, stable Iraq under Shiite control. To get a friendly, stable, Shiite Iraq, Iran needs the U.S.

It may sound like a win-win situation, but like everything geopolitical, it’s not that simple in any way. It’s complicated by bad U.S.-Iran relations and uncooperative presidents on both sides. Iran wants a more Shiite dominated, Iranian influenced Iraq than the U.S. would care to give them. But Iran has had one huge bargaining chip the U.S. hasn’t been able to ignore: its nuclear weapons program.

Up until a few months ago, when the current NIE was being finalized, it appeared Iran had a weapons program (the last NIE thought the same). Iran didn’t mind; it gave them a huge bargaining chip. So, behind back doors, it played along.

But now Iran has lost this influence, because of this report. The U.S. could have the upper hand in Iraq negotiations, and Bush could receive a more favorable view from historians than even appeared possible six months ago.

Use number three, “an excuse for not going to war with Iran,” has just as much to do with Bush’s legacy as use number three. A third war on the president’s report card would be given an ‘F’ by historians, and could possibly an expulsion (read: impeachment) by the school administrators even before that.

Of course, this is a very oversimplified version of the situation. There are many more players involved: Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc.

Effects
Now that we’re done with all that, it’s probably a pretty good idea to see the consequences of the report. These, compared to the reasoning for the report, are simple.

1. Repercussions at U.S.-Iran discussions over Iraq (as discussed above)
2. Allies less likely to pursue sanctions at the U.N. (specifically Russia and China)
3. Virtually no chance of war with Iran
4. Cheney very disappointed (just kidding)

It will be interesting to see how this plays out in the months ahead.

On My NIE Analysis
Do You Think the Iranians Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
The Significance of the NIE
How Will the Bush Administration Use the NIE Report?

Tuesday, November 27, 2007

The Annapolis Conference: More Hurtful Than Helpful?


Yes, then Israelis and Palestiians appear to be finally making some progress. But it is hard to be optimistic. Beyond the Cusp (a fantastic blog/blogger) takes a cold, hard look at reality. What happens if Annapolis does succeed? He goes on to make 3 main points:

1. Implementation of the agreement would be extremely difficult
2. Once Israel withdraws from the Palestinian territories (which will be certainly part of the agreement), Hamas will take power from Fatah and declare any agreement invalid.
3. If the agreement appears unsuccessful, Iran and/or Syria could take advantage of the situation and could possibly invade Israel, leading to a regional war.

Hits the nail on the head.